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Abstract-We propose a low complexity transmit signal design 
scheme for achieving information-theoretic secrecy over a MIMO 
wiretap channel driven by finite-alphabet inputs. We assume that 
the transmitter has perfect channel state information (CSI) of the 
main channel and also knows the statistics of the eavesdropper's 
channel. The proposed transmission scheme relies on jointly 
optimizing the precoder matrix and the artificial noise so as to 
maximize the achievable secrecy rates. In order to lower the 
computational complexity associated with the transmit signal 
design, we employ a design metric using the cut-off rate instead of 
the mutual information. We formulate a gradient-descent based 
optimization algorithm and demonstrate via extensive numerical 
examples that the proposed signal design scheme can yield 
an enhanced secrecy performance compared with the existing 
solutions in spite of its relatively lower computational complexity. 
The impacts of the modulation order as well as the number of 
antennas at the transmitter and receiver ends on the achievable 
secrecy rates are also investigated. 
Index Terms - Physical layer security, MIMO wiretap chan­
nel, precoding, finite-alphabet inputs, cut-off rate. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Due to its open nature, wireless communications are prone 
to eavesdropping attacks. On the other hand, with the ever­
growing demand for the services which rely on data transfer 
over wireless networks, a challenging issue is the security of 
the transmitted information. Securing the communications at 
the physical layer is an alternative to the conventional higher­
network-layer solutions, such as encryption, which can resolve 
the vulnerabilities and the complexities associated with key 
distribution and management. The basic principle of physical 
layer security, also known as information-theoretic security, 
is to exploit the randomness of the communication channels 
to allow a transmitter to deliver its message to an intended 
receiver while guaranteeing that a third party cannot infer any 
information about the transmitted message. 
Among the studies in the area of physical layer security, the 
multiple-input multiple-output multiple-antenna eavesdropper 
(MIMOME) wiretap channels have been of particular interest 
[1]. While exploiting multiple antennas for transmission is, 
in general, an effective means to combat fading in wireless 
communications and to increase capacity or robustness, it 
does not give rise to an unconditional improvement from a 
physical layer security perspective. This is due to the fact 
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that the unintended receiver is also capable of attaining an 
improved reception performance. Therefore, so as to achieve 
an increased secrecy using multiple-antennas, one needs to 
design a suitable transmission scheme which adopts an appro­
priate preprocessing algorithm so as to prevent the unintended 
receiver from benefiting fully from the MIMO performance 
gains. 
An example of such a scheme is artificial noise (AN)-aided 
beamforming for which information is transmitted along the 
directions in which the legitimate receiver can experience a 
gain and on the contrary synthetic noise is sent along the direc­
tions which have the least effect on the reception performance 
of the intended receiver. Beamforming and precoding schemes 
are other examples of techniques which can be employed so 
as to transmit signals in directions which result in maximal 
signal quality difference at the legitimate receiver and the 
eavesdropper. With the assumption that the channel input is 
Gaussian, it has been shown in [2] and [3] that MIMOME 
channel can be decomposed into independent subchannels cor­
responding to the generalized eigenvectors, and the transmitter 
uses the subchannels over which the legitimate receiver has an 
advantage with respect to the eavesdropper. 
While most of the studies in the literature are based on 
Gaussian source signals, more practical studies of the MI­
MOME channel, e.g., [4] and [5], have characterized the 
achievable secrecy rates of multiple-antenna wiretap channels 
with finite-alphabet inputs. In [4], a generalized singular value 
decomposition (GSVD) aided precoding has been proposed 
which decomposes the MIMOME channel into a bank of 
parallel subchannels and accordingly a power allocation is 
carried out. After proving that the proposed strategy in [4] 
is suboptimal, authors in [5] formulate the optimal transmit 
precoding scheme with the aid of the perfect channel state 
information (CSI) corresponding to the main channel and the 
evesdropper's channel. 
While the algorithm proposed in [5] is optimal for the 
perfect CSI case, its solution for the cases without the perfect 
eavesdropper's CSI (ECSI) is suboptimal. This is due to the 
fact that, in the adopted transmit signal design approach, the 
power is assigned to the artificial noise only in the cases where 
excess power is available. In other words, no optimization is 
carried out over the power assigned to the artificial noise. To 
resolve this issue, in this paper, we propose a joint precoder 
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and artificial noise optimization scheme. Through numerical 
examples, we show that by jointly optimizing the precoder 
and the artificial noise, higher secrecy rates can be achieved 
compared to the case of optimization of the precoder matrix 
only, as done in [5]. 
We also introduce a low complexity alternative to directly 
maximizing the ergodic secrecy rates, as it possesses a high 
complexity due to the need for several evaluations of the mu­
tual information expression which lacks a closed-form and can 
only be estimated using Monte Carlo methods. We formulate a 
cut-off rate based approximation for the ergodic secrecy rates 
and demonstrate that maximizing this approximate expression 
requires considerably lower computational effort. Moreover, 
we study the impact of the number of antennas as well as 
the modulation order on the secrecy rates attained with the 
proposed signalling method. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the 
system model under consideration. In Section III, we formulate 
the joint signal and artificial noise design. Section IV presents 
several numerical examples which demonstrate the efficacy of 
the proposed transmit signal design scheme, and Section V 
concludes the paper. 
Throughout the paper, vectors and matrices are denoted with 
the lowercase and uppercase bold letters. The expectation of 
a random variable X is represented by lEx{.}  and ( . ) H, ( . )T 
and II . IIF denote Hermitian, transpose and Frobenius norm 
operations. 
II. SY STEM MODEL 
Consider a general MIMOME wiretap channel. The trans­
mitter, Alice, the legitimate receiver, Bob, and the eavesdrop­
per, Eve, are assumed to be equipped with Nt, Nrb and Nrc 
antennas, respectively. 
The received vectors at Bob and Eve can be written as: 
(I) 
(2) 
where Hb and He are the Nr" x Nt and Nr,. x Nt channel 
matrices corresponding to the legitimate receiver's channel 
and the eavesdropper's channel, respectively. The elements 
of the channel matrix Hb are independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) with distribution CN(O, 1). We model the 
eavesdropper's channel as a doubly correlated fading MIMO 
channel, namely, 
(3) 
where \I! r and \I! t are the transmit and receive correlation 
matrices. He is a complex matrix with i.i.d. zero mean 
unit variance Gaussian entries. lly and llz are i.i.d. additive 
white Gaussian noise terms. The elements of noise vectors 
follow circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distributions, 
CN(O, (J� ) and CN(O, (J� ), respectively. Furthermore, Hb, 
He, lly a�d llz are independent. It is assumed that the fading 
process is ergodic. The legitimate receiver and the eavesdrop­
per know their own channels perfectly. The transmitter knows 
the instantaneous channel of the legitimate receiver and only 
the statistics of the eavesdropper's CSI. In other words, the 
transmitter knows the correlation matrices \I! r and \I! t and 
the noise variance at the eavesdropper. One example of the 
scenarios where transmitter can acquire such information is 
in cellular networks where eavesdropper is also a valid user 
of the network, long-term channel statistics of whom can be 
estimated by the transmitter. 
With the assumption that Nt > Nrt" the objective is to 
construct a precoded signal as 
Vb S=PS+QAN U, (4) JNt - Nr" 
where P E CNt x Nt is the precoding matrix and S E CNt x 1 
is the transmitted signal vector with zero mean and identity 
covariance matrix. Each element of S is drawn from a discrete 
modulation constellation, such as NI-QAM or .iVI-PSK. Vb E 
CNi x (Ni -NT,,) stands for the orthonormal basis of the null 
space of Hb and u denotes the artificial noise which follows 
CN(O,INi-NrJ. The portion of the power assigned to the 
artificial noise is determined by the coefficient QAN. 
We consider two channel models corresponding to the 
legitimate receiver as follows. 
1) Constant Main Channel: For this scenario similar to [5] 
- [6], the ergodic secrecy rate can be calculated as 
2) Fading Main Channel: In this case, we assume that the 
channel gains are fixed during each coherence interval whereas 
they change independently from one coherence interval to the 
next. Furthermore, each coherence interval is large enough so 
that random coding arguments can be invoked. In this scenario, 
the secrecy rate is calculated using [7] 
Rs = lEH,,,H,(J(s; yIHb) - J(s; zIHe))+. (6) 
III. JOINT PRE CODER AND ARTIFICIAL NorSE DESIGN 
With the aid of the instantaneous knowledge of the main 
channel and the statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper's 
channel, we seek to find the optimal P and QAN which 
maximize the ergodic secrecy rate, Rs. This optimization 
problem is given as 
max Rs 
P, nAN 
A. Direct Maximization of Rs 
(7) 
(8) 
Due to the nonconvexity of the problem in (7)-(8), obtaining 
a closed-form globally optimal solution is intractable. How­
ever, it is possible to implement numerical algorithms which 
iteratively search for local maxima of the objective function. 
First, we formulate the optimization over P with a fixed QAN. 
In this case, the optimization problem can be formulated as 
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Algorithm 1 Gradient Descent for Maximizing Rs 
Consider different values for ctAN E [0 v'MJ and for each value 
of ctAN, repeat: 
Step 1: Initialize PI with constraint tr(PIPf) ::; Nt - ct�N' Set step 
size u and min. tolerance Umin 
Step 2: Set k = 1, compute RSI = Rs (PI) 
Step 3: Compute V P, Rs (P) 
Step 4: If U 2> Umin goto Step 5, otherwise Stop algorithm and 
retum Pk 
A A A H 
Step 5: Calculate Pk = Pk + uVPkRs(P) and if tr(PkPk ) > Nt -
2 r p Nt-O:�N p ctAN, norma Ize as k:= lr(l\p2) k 
Step 6: Compute As = RsCPk); If Rs 2> RSk update RSHI = Rs 
and Pk+1 = Pk & goto Step 8, O/W let U = 0.5u and goto Step 4 
Step 7: k = k + 1 goto Step 3 
Select ctAN and the corresponding optimal P which result in the 
maximum Rs: 
where the instantaneous mutual information over the main 
channel is given by [8] 
where dmk = Sm -Sk and !vI is the modulation order. Mutual 
information over the eavesdropper's channel, i.e., 1(s; zIHe), 
can be calculated similarly. 
In order to solve this optimization problem, a gradient 
descent algorithm [9] can be employed. In order to obtain the 
optimal (aAN,P), we repeat this gradient descent algorithm 
for different values of aAN and select the best (aAN' P) 
as described in Algorithm I. For each value of aAN, the 
algorithm should be repeated with multiple initializations of 
P to increase the likelihood for the gradient descent algorithm 
to converge to the globally optimal solution. 
Gradient of Rs can be calculated as 
log2 e ( H ) \7 Rs(P) = -2- Hb HbP�b(P) any 
_ IEH, { 1��2 e ( H� HeP�b (P)) }, (12) 
where �b (P) and �e (P) are the receive minimum mean square 
error (MMSE) matrices at the legitimate receiver and the 
eavesdropper, respectively, and are given by [10] 
�b(P) = IE{ (s -1E{sIY} )(s -lE{sIY} )H}, 
�e(P) = IE{ (s -1E{slz} )(s -1E{slz} )H}. 
B. Cut-off Rate Based Approximation for Rs 
(13) 
(14) 
The instantaneous and average mutual information terms in 
(5) lack closed-form expressions and involve multiple inte­
grals. To estimate 1(s; ylHb) and lEuJ(s; zIHe ) , one can take 
advantage of Monte Carlo methods, which require averaging 
over sufficiently large number of noise and channel samples. 
Accordingly, finding the optimal P and aAN which maximize 
Rs in (5) is a computationally complex task. A gradient 
descent type solution for maximization of Rs, similar to the 
ones proposed in [5] and [11], requires several evaluations 
of the mutual information expression as well as the gradient 
of the mutual information, which also lacks a closed-form. 
Hence, employing a closed-form approximation of Rs and 
maximizing this approximation can significantly reduce the 
computational complexity associated with the transmit signal 
design. 
We define a cut-off rate based metric as 
R' = R(B) _ R- (E) 's '0 ,0 , (15) 
where R� is an approximation of the instantaneous secrecy 
rate, with R�B) being the instantaneous cut-off rate for Bob, 
which is a valid lower bound on the mutual information, given 
by [12, Eq. (4.3.34)] 
and Ro (E) is the average cut-off rate over the eavesdropper's 
channel. If either Nr, = 1 or Nt - Nrb = 1, the expression 
for Ro (E) is obtained as 
Ro (E) = 2Nt log M 
1 "" "" IE 2) e e 2) 
MNt MNt 
( dJ[PHHHH Pd· ) - og L: 7 H, exp - 4((J�z + a�NIIWI12) , (17) 
where W = �. The expression in (17) is derived in Nt-NT 'b 
the following manner. The received vector at the eavesdropper 
can be written as 
(18) 
If either Nrc = 1 or Nt - Nrb = 1, the summation of the 
artificial noise and the additive white Gaussian noise, i.e., ll� = 
aANWu + llz , is a zero-mean white Gaussian vector with 
covariance ((J�z +a�NIIWI12)INrc' However, in the cases with 
Nr, > 1 and Nt - Nr" oj=. 1, the vector ll� would be a zero­
mean colored Gaussian vector. In such cases, the cut-off rate 
expression in (17) as well as the mutual information over the 
eavesdropper's channel can be obtained after whitening ll� 
(see, e.g., Lemma 3.1 in [13]). 
In order to demonstrate that employing the closed-form 
design metric in (15) instead of directly maximizing (5) 
can significantly reduce the computational complexity, we 
compare the matrix multiplication steps required for evaluation 
of Rs and R� in Table I. We assume that Nsamp is the 
number of sample points required for an accurate estimation 
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of the expectation operators, lEn and lEue. For instance, it 
can be observed through numerical experiments that a suffi­
ciently accurate estimation of the average mutual information 
lEuJ(s; zlHe) requires an averaging over at least Nsamp = 500 
realizations of noise and channel coefficients. Accordingly, 
Table I reveals that the computational complexity associated 
with calculation of R� is considerably smaller than that of Rs. 
TABLE I: Number of matrix multiplication steps 
12k!' t Nsmnp 12k!' t Nsam 
Our extensive numerical evaluations demonstrate that R� 
serves as a valid approximation of Rs even though its evalua­
tion requires significantly reduced computational complexity. 
Hence, maximization of R� is a reasonable alternative. In 
order to maximize R�, we jointly optimize P and QAN using 
Algorithm 1 and by replacing Rs with R�. We apply the matrix 
differentiation technique in [14] to derive the gradient of R� 
as shown on top of the next page in (19). 
C. Search Region for the Optimal QAN 
Since an exhaustive search is performed over the values of 
QAN to obtain the optimal pair (QAN, P), defining a criterion 
for such a search is mandatory for keeping the computational 
complexity at a reasonable level. In the scenarios with finite­
alphabet inputs and with equal SNR values at the legitimate 
receiver and the eavesdropper, lower fractions of the power 
should be allocated to data transmission at higher SNRs 
[6]. This is due to the fact that, under finite-alphabet input 
constraints, transmission at full power for high SNRs allows 
the eavesdropper to acquire the maximum number of bits per 
channel use which results in zero secrecy. With this key point 
in mind, for a fixed main channel given as 
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Fig. 1: R� with precoding for the main channel given in (20) 
and with no correlation over the eavesdropper's channel versus 
fractions of power allocated to artificial noise. 
we compare the ergodic secrecy rates with precoding versus 
the fractions of power allocated to artificial noise for different 
SNR values. It is clear from Fig. 1 that the optimal QAN 
depends on the SNR value, and that the higher the SNR, 
the higher is the fraction of power allocated to the artificial 
noise. More specifically, it is desirable to allocate 0, 8 and 
33 percentages of the total power to the artificial noise at the 
SNR values of -5dB, 5dB and 15dB, respectively, for this 
example. Basically, it is possible to limit the searching space 
of the optimization in Algorithm 1 to reduce the computational 
costs. 
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
In order to demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed sig­
nal design schemes, we provide several numerical examples. 
Throughout the simulations, equal noise levels are assumed at 
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. The numerical 
results are provided for the scenarios with constant and fading 
main channels. 
A. Constant Main Channel 
In this scenario, the secrecy rate is calculated using (5). 
More than 500 realizations of He are considered for evalua­
tion of the average mutual information for the eavesdropper. 
Figure 2 compares the ergodic secrecy rates for three different 
transmit signal design algorithms. A fixed main channel has 
been considered as given in (20). The eavesdropper's channel 
is assumed to be correlated according to (3) where Wt and 
W,.. have exponential entries, i.e., 
[.T, ] li-jl '£: t ij = Pt , 
with Pt = 0.9 and Pr = 1. 
and [w ] . .  = p1i-jl r 2J r , (21) 
Figure 2 indicates the suboptimality of the transmit signal 
design scheme in [5], as it can be observed that maximization 
of Rs with jointly optimizing the precoder matrix and the 
power allocated to the artificial noise, i.e., employing Algo­
rithm 1, can yield higher secrecy rates. Furthermore, it can 
be inferred from Fig. 2 that, the maximization of the cut­
off rate based design metric R� using Algorithm 1 yields a 
relatively small loss with respect to the scheme proposed in 
[5] in low and moderate SNR values. The proposed algorithm 
can also outperform the algorithm in [5] in high SNRs due to 
the further optimization carried out over the power assigned 
to the artificial noise. 
B. Fading Main Channel 
In this scenario, Algorithm 1 is applied for each realization 
of Hb and the secrecy rate is averaged over 500 realizations 
of Hb and He according to (6). In this experiment, the 
eavesdropper's channel is assumed to be correlated as in (3) 
where the transmit and receive correlations are calculated 
according to (21) with Pt = 0.8 and P,.. = 0.8. 
Figure 3 compares the secrecy rates achieved by different 
transmissions with different number of transmit antennas and 
for different channel inputs. Figure 3 reveals an important 
difference between the secrecy behavior of the Gaussian 
source and that of practical inputs picked from a discrete 
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MNt MNt 
� � (d�pHHf"HbPdij)T exp(-d�pHHf"HbPdij/4<Tl, ) i=l j=l J 
VR�(P) = MNt MNt 
4<T�y � � exp( -d;;j,pHHf"HbPdi' j' / 4<T�y) i'=l j'=l 
4 
3.5 
-5 o 5 
, -..... ' Algorithm 4 in 15] 
__ Algorithm 1 (maximizing R's) 
_ . _Algorithm 1 (maximizing R) 
10 SNR 15 20 25 30 
Fig. 2: Secrecy rates with QPSK input for the main channel 
given in (20) and the eavesdropper channels with Pt = 0.9 
and Pr = l. 
constellation. While the achievable secrecy rates with 
Gaussian inputs increase monotonically with increasing SNR, 
it saturates for the finite-alphabet input scenarios. According 
to Fig. 3, when the SNR is sufficiently high, the proposed 
transmit signal design scheme provides achievable secrecy 
rates close to Nt log lvI, i.e., the maximum rate which 
can be attained by the legitimate receiver in the context 
of finite-alphabet constraints. Also, it reveals that, with a 
fixed number of receive antennas, the achievable secrecy 
rates increase by increasing Nt and lvI. Thanks to the joint 
optimization of the precoder matrix and the artificial noise, 
the proposed transmit signal design scheme is capable of 
5 �_ � _� � : : :: �:�::: :�: �:� ¥ 4.5 _Nt=2,M= 4 
� 4 -+-Nt=4, M =2 8- """"T-Nt=2,M=2 [l 3.5 
rn �--�----�� 
"' 3 1J' � 2.5 
Q) 
� 2 
:is � 1.5 
Q) :c � 1 
10 15 
SNR (dB) 20 25 30 
Fig. 3: Achievable secrecy rates for fading main channel, with 
different values of lvI and Nt and Nr" where Nrb = l. 
providing positive secrecy rates even for the cases where the 
eavesdropper is equipped with a higher number of antennas 
compared to the legitimate receiver. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, with the assumption of statistical knowledge 
on the eavesdropper's channel, we derived a cut-off rate 
based approximation for the ergodic secrecy rates of a MIMO 
wiretap channel for finite-alphabet inputs. An iterative joint 
precoder and artificial noise design scheme is proposed which 
maximizes this approximation. Extensive numerical results 
demonstrate that the proposed transmit signal design method 
provides positive secrecy rates in a variety of scenarios and 
yields an enhanced secrecy performance compared to the ex­
isting solutions in spite of its significantly lower computational 
complexity. 
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